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SECOND IMPACT DOCTRINE
THE SECOND ACCIDENT IMPACT
ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN MISSISSIPPI
Introduction
There exists in Mississippi case law a distinct gap between
the protective rights of a consumer and the liability of a manufac-
turer who sells a defective product which causes an injury to a
consumer. This gap is variously referred to as the "second im-
pact", the "second accident", and the "crash worthiness" doctrine,'
but by any name, the principle insulates and immunizes a manufac-
turer from liability where the product did not contribute to the
initial cause of an accident or collision.
The second impact doctrine made its debut in Mississippi in
1969, when it was first espoused in Walton v. Chrysler Motor
Corporation,' a case involving an automobile manufacturer. The
rule, however, has been extended to all types of manufactured
goods including airplanes' and tractors.' The results have
significantly altered the course of products liability in this state,
whether the action is based on negligent design,' implied or ex-
pressed warranty,6 or strict liability theories." When applied to
each theory, the second impact doctrine removes the potentially
dangerous and injury producing product from the case on a "quasi-
proximate cause" theory.8
The persistent adherence to this theory in a "pure" comparative
negligence state such as Mississippi,9 particularly in light of the
adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965) by
the supreme court," reveals more than mere inconsistency. It will
be shown that Walton, in pronouncing a policy decision concern-
1. See Note, Manufacturer's Liabilityfor an "Uncrashworthy Automobile", 52 CORNELL L.
Q. 444 (1967); Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and its After-
math, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1969).
2. 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
3. Pattillo v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 379 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1980).
4. Landrum v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 473 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1973).
5. Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970).
6. General Motors Corporation v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971).
7. Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corporation, 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
8. In Walton, proximate cause of accident is substituted for proximate cause of the injury.
9. Mississippi is the only state which has adopted "pure" comparative negligence. In other
words, no degree of contributory negligence will bar plaintiffs claim unless that negligence con-
tributed 100% to the cause of the injury. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); Annot., 32
A.L.R. 3d 463, 473 (1970).
10. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966).
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ing automobile manufacturers, in effect, adopted a "Trojan Horse"
theory from the Seventh Circuit, which is not only ill-suited, but
contradictory to the general principles of negligence, warranty,
and strict liability previously expounded by the court.
SECOND IMPACT IN PERSPECTIVE
Evans
In 1966, the same year that Mississippi recognized the doc-
trine of strict products liability,11 the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals created the controversial second accident rule in the case
of Evans v. General Motors Corporation. " In that case, the plain-
tiff charged'that the death of her husband was caused by the failure
of their 1961 Chevrolet station wagon, which had been manufac-
tured with an "X" frame, to provide side frame rails for protec-
tion of a driver involved in side impact collisions. Her husband
was killed following an impact which caused the left side of the
station wagon to collapse upon her husband.13 The complaint
charged, in three counts, negligence, breach of implied warran-
ty, and strict tort liability." The court, however, took a different
view and denied the plaintiff recovery on all counts because "the
intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participa-
tion in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's
ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur.""5
The court noted that in all of the cases relied upon by the
plaintiff, some defect was "[tihe cause of the accidental injuries." 6
Thus was born the principle that because a manufacturer has no
duty to produce an "accident-proof' automobile, no defect in an
automobile which is the cause of enhanced or consequential in-
juries will be the basis of liability unless that defect played some
role in the initial cause of the accident.1
7
Citing Campo v. Scofield,"s the court expressed the view that
If. Id.
12. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
13. Id. at 823.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 825.
16. Id. The court cited one of the plaintiffs cases, Ford Motor Company v. Zahn, 265 F.2d
729 (8th Cir. 1959) where an ashtray caused the injury but not the accident, in contradiction to
this statement.
17. Id. at 824. Evans never expressly stated that a defect must be the cause of the accident,
but this was the subse4uent interpretation of courts following Evans. See, e.g., Schemel v. General
Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Schumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp.
311 (E.D. Ohio, 1967).
18. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E. 2d 802 (1950). Campo involved a privity of contract issue; thus,
its import loses a great deal of thrust in transition to second accident. Campo was overruled by
the Court of Appeals in Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 39 N.Y.2d 376,
348 N.E. 2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
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despite the desirability of "collision-protective" designs of vehicles,
the duty to so design must be imposed by the legislative branch
of the government, and not the judicial. 9
Larsen
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit, in Larsen v. General
Motors Corporation,2 ° rejected the logic of Evans and held that
the intended use of an automobile does encompass accidents
because they are "readily foreseeable as an incident to the nor-
mal and expected use of an automobile."21 In Larsen, the plaintiff
charged that his injuries were caused by a rearward thrust of the
steering merchanism into the plaintiffs head following a head-on
collision. As in Evans, the plaintiff did not allege that the design
of the steering merchanism caused the accident, but he alleged
that the defective design caused injuries he would not have other-
wise received, or alternatively, that the injuries sustained were
enhanced because of the defect." While the complaint charged
three counts,23 the court held General Motors liable on theories
of negligent design and failure to warn. " In imposing liability,
the court reviewed numerous cases on manufacturer liability, in-
cluding two cases cited by the plaintiff in Evans. 5 The court
ultimately observed that:
No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations
where the defect in design or manufacture was the causative fac-
tor of the accident, as the accident and resulting injury, usually
caused by the so called "second collision" of the passenger with
the interior part of the automobile, are all foreseeable. Where the
injuries or enhanced injuries are due to the manufacturer's failure
to avoid subjecting the user of its products to an unreasonable
risk of injury, general negligence principles should be applicable.'
In reply to General Motors' argument that it would be dif-
ficult to assess that portion of the injuries caused by defective
design over and above the injuries that would have occurred as
19. 359 F.2d at 824.
20. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 502.
22. Id. at 496-97.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 505-06.
25. Carpini v. Pittsburgh and Wierton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3rd Cir. 1954); Ford Motor
Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959).
26. 391 F.2d at 502. In footnote 3, the court quoted an article, Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L. J. 816 (1962). According to Noel,
"unreasonable danger" is determined by general negligence principles which involve a balancing
of likelihood, gravity, and precautions effective to avoid harm. Noel, supra. at 818.
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a result of the collision, the court replied "[t]he obstacles of ap-
portionment are not insurmountable. It is done with regularity in
those jurisdictions applying comparative negligence statutes"7 (em-
phasis added). Additionally, the Larsen court pointed out that
neither reason, nor logic, nor any precedent bound the court to
force a distinction between negligent design and negligent con-
struction of an automobile. "8
In contrast to Evans, Larsen acknowledged the fact that in-
tended use includes obviously foreseeable risks incident to the utili-
ty of a product,29 and emphasized that legislative safety standards
imposed on automobile design by Congress were not made ex-
clusive to the common law jurisdiction of the courts.3 0 Thus,
Larsen held General Motors liable on a common law standard
of duty to use reasonable care in light of existing circumstances,
leaving the legislature to impose higher standards, or the courts
to expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort.
3 1
Abdication of Evans
Subsequent to the Evans and Larsen decisions, a controver-
sy raged concerning the extent of a manufacturer's duty to design
a safe product. While Evans took an early lead in the duel, 2 the
decisive trend turned and remained in the Larsen camp. 31 Present-
(text continued on page 352)
27. 391 F.2d at 502.
28. Id. at 504.
29. The court cited numerous articles relating statistics on the high probability of automobile
collisions. The safety engineer for General Motors was quoted: "The two car collision ...is
so important statistically that car structure has to be evaluated under these conditions." 391 F.
2d at 504 n. 7. See also 391 F.2d at 502.
30. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)
(1976): "Compliance with any federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter
does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." See 391 F.2d at 506.
31. 391 F.2d at 506. In respect to Michigan law, the court noted that there is no dispositive
showing on the doctrine of strict liability, especially as to automobiles.
32. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); McClung v. Ford
Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W.Va. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973); Alexander
v. Seaboard Airline Railroad Co., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. N.C. 1971); Shumard v. General
Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So.
2d 568 (Miss. 1970).
33. JURISDICTIONS FOLLOWING LARSEN OR THE EQUIVALENT
JURISDICTION CASE
Alabama Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d
134 (Ala. 1976).
Alaska Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454
P.2d 244 (Alaska, 1969).
Arizona Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., Inc., 119 Ariz.
502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1978).
California Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359,






























Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d
305 (1978).
Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201
(Fla. 1976).
Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App.
706, 165 S.E. 2d 734 (1968).
Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho
742, 553 P.2d 1306 (1976).
Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th
Cir. 1974).
Buehler v. Whaler, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d
460 (1978).
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th
Cir. 1977).
Parwaters v.General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
Gorst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484
P. 2d 47 (1971).
Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.
1975) (federal court considering how a Florida
court would think a Kentucky court would
decide).
Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.
1974).
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich.
App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975).
Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
1959).
Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
Brallenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 102 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217
N.W.2d 831 (1974).
Huddel v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D. N.J.
1975).
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 41 A.D.2d 54, 341
N.Y.S. 2d 846, afid, 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305,
N.E.2d 769, 341 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1973) (defect
must be latent).
Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, 438 F. Supp. 1
(E.D. N.C. 1976). Sealey v. Ford Motor Co.,
499 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. N.C. 1980) (no strict
liability in N.C. law).
Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d
57 (N.D. 1974).
Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270
(S.D. Ohio 1975).
McMullen v. Volkswagen of America, 274 Or.
83, 545 P.2d 117 (1976) (en banc).
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp.
1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st
Cir. 1974).
Michle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d
173 (1969).
Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205
N.W.2d 104 (1973).
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ly, thirty-seven jurisdictions apply the Larsen rule or its equivalent,
and only two others which have considered it, Mississippi and
West Virginia, fail to follow Larsen."
This trend can probably be best attributed to the growing
sophistication of the courts with products liability"5 and the
awareness that consumer protection cannot be adequately provided
for by so narrow a view of intended use as defined in Evans.
Another significant factor has been the adoption by many jurisdic-
tions of the concept of strict tort liability as embodied in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965). 36 This section
obviates any requirement of showing negligence in the manufac-
ture of a product. Defective result is sufficient, no matter how
carefully a product is manufactured. Interestingly enough, the
Seventh Circuit, the same court which created the second acci-
dent theory, recognized and concluded, ten years after its Evans
decision, that no rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situa-
tions where the product defect was the immediate cause of the
accident.
In Huff v. White Motor Corporation," Evans was reversed
after a detailed analysis of the state of the law in Indiana, most
notably, the adoption by the state of §402A of the Restatement.
Tennessee Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W. 2d 516
(Tenn. 1973).
Texas Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d
497 (Tex. Cir. App. 1974).
Virginia Dreisontok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
Washington Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83
Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974).
Wisconsin Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225
N.W.2d 431 (1975).
Wyoming Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123
(Wyo. 1Q78).
34. Walton, 229 So. 2d 568. McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W.Va.
1971), affd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973).
35. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L. J. 30 (1973);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825 (1973); Dohaner,
Piehler, Twerski, Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx.
L. REV. 1303 (1974); James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192 (1955).
36. §402A: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
37. 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
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The court reviewed the abandonment of Evans by a majority of
jurisdictions, " the numerous criticisms it had received from com-
mentators, and the trend in products liability law to increase the
duty owed by manufacturers for injury-causing products. '
Recognizing that the tide had turned since the Evans decision,
it was concluded:
One who is injured as a result of a mechanical defect in a motor
vehicle should be protected under the doctrine of strict liability
even though the defect was not the cause of the collision which
precipitated the injury .... [A] collision may precipitate the
malfunction of a defective part and cause injury. In that cir-
cumstance the collision, the defect, and the injury are interdepen-
dent and should be viewed as a combined event .... Since colli-
sions for whatever cause are foreseeable events, the scope of liabili-
ty should be commensurate with the scope of foreseeable risk."'
(emphasis added).
Thus, Huff did away with Evans. While Larsen was decided
on a theory of negligence, Huff went one step further and com-
pletely rejected the narrow Evans view of intended use as it ap-
plied to strict liability.1 A number of jurisdictions have carried
over this Huff rejection, using the same "foreseeability" aspect
of intended use as determining liability 2 with no apparent
dichotomy resulting from the injection of this negligence concept
into a construction of the doctrine of strict products liability. One
court has suggested that Evans, if interpreted literally, fails to
recognize that intended use was first employed in products liability
cases "merely to illustrate the broader central doctrine of
foreseeability. The phrase was not meant to preclude manufac-
turer responsibility for the probable ancillary consequences of nor-
mal use.""3 Further, Larsen and its progeny, including Huff and
the strict liability decisions, have all recognized that the environ-
ment in which a product is used is a necessary corollary to the
definition of intended use of a product." By broadening the scope
38. Id. at 108. It was noted that, "Moreover, no court has followed Evans since 1969 when
the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Corporation v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797
(Miss. 1970)." Id.
39. Id. at 108-09.
40. Id. at 109.
4 1. Circuit Judges Pell and Bauer disagreed with the denial for rehearing and stated: "I do
not regard 'used as intended' to include jackknifing a truck-tractor." Id. at 109 n. 7.
42. See, e.g., Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D. D.C. 1972)
(construing Maryland law); Dyson v. General Motors Corp. (E.D. Pa. 1969) (construing Penn-
sylvania law).
43. Turcotte v. Ford Motor Company, 494 F.2d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1974).
44. Most of their decisions involved automobiles, but see Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp.,
484 F.2d 1025 (1st. Cir. 1973) (a manufacturer was held strictly liable when a child's nightgown
burst into flames after contact with a hot electric range).
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of intended use, these decisions have not imposed absolute liability
on manufacturers, 5 but have allowed awards to plaintiffs for in-
jury producing defects, predicated on the general principles gov-
erning tort law.
THE EFFECT OF WALTON
Initial Cause of Accident
Mississippi, in the Walton decision, 6 was one of the first
jurisdictions to give allegiance to the enhanced injury rule pro-
pounded in Evans. The court's ruling is significant in that it has
effectively closed the courthouse door to second impact cases in
this state, despite the great weight of authority adhering to the
contrary Larsen view, in contradiction to the court's adoption of
the strict liability doctrine, and in deference to prior negligence
principles adhered to by the court, including the parameters ap-
plicable to the concepts of foreseeability and multiple proximate
cause of injury.
Reviewing Walton, it is clear that the court relied almost en-
tirely on the logic of Evans in asserting a policy decision that
automobile manufacturers would not be liable for defects which
did not cause the initial accident, even though such defects "when
combined with the force put in motion by the accident, [did] add
to, or become a part of the cause of injury to a human being.""
The plaintiff in Walton was involved in an automobile colli-
sion, the force of which propelled him against the back of the
seat of his automobile so that the plaintiff was flung forward in
a prone position against the steering wheel." He charged that his
injury was caused by the joint negligence of the other driver and
the manufacturer for negligent design and improper manufacture
of the seat "which was not reasonably safe for its intended use." 9
With no explanation, the court completely ignored the charge of
negligence and concluded that the issue was strictly a question
of law, of whether the strict liability rule would be expanded to
include manufacturer liability for enhanced injury."s The Walton
court included a lengthy discussion of both the Evans and Larsen
45. See, e.g., Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E. 2d 173 (1969).
46. Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 569 (Miss. 1970).
47. Id. at 570.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court stated that because the issue in Walton was a question of law, there was
no reason to discuss whether Chrysler Motor Corporation would be liable in a proper case "where
knowledge of an alleged defect is shown in evidence." Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 2:347
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points of view, but concluded that the majority of jurisdictions
favored the theory of Evans.s" Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that "intended use" of an automobile does not include the
foreseeable event of collisions, and thus defects which do not cause
initial accidents cannot be held accountable under strict liability
in tort. The actual holding of the court in Walton was narrowly
drawn in reference to automobiles and was prefixed with an im-
plication at least that manufacturers of other types of products
would be judged on a case by case basis. "
Paradoxically, in contrast to Walton, the scope of intended
use of a product was given broad dimension in the analysis of
strict liability by the court in State Stove where it was simply stated
that the manufacturer is strictly liable if he markets a product which
is not reasonably safe, and the plaintiff is injured because of a
contemplated use of that product."3 Further, State Stove emphasized
the fact that "whether a product is reasonably safe or not is a flex-
ible standard responsive to the facts of each case" and the pro-
duct in question."
Expansion of Walton
The curious alignment of intended use with the idea of the
initial cause of the accident as outlined by Walton proved to be
an unresponsive duo to the plaintiff in a products action, for as
it developed, the plaintiff was required to first pass the hurdle
of "initial cause" before the "intended use" of the product would
even be discussed. The flexible standard "responsive to the facts
of each case" became the axiom; "the defect must cause the in-
itial accident," and the "intended use" concept was effectively
foreclosed by the court as a basis of liability.
For example, in General Motors Corporation v. Howard,"5
the plaintiff charged manufacturer responsibility for injury
resulting from the failure of a telescopic steering column to
telescope during a collision. Admitting that the telescopic steer-
ing column was a safety feature designed and advertised as such
to lessen injury on collision, the court did not decide on "intend-
ed use" but overturned the lower court's vedict for the plaintiff
51. Id. at 572.
52. Id. The holding begins: "Although it is true that the manufacturer is liable for defects
in its intended use. . . ." Id.
53. 189 So. 2d at 121 (citing Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW. L. J.
5 at 15, 25 (1965)).
54. Id. (citing Wade, supra note 53,,at 17).
55. 249 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1971).
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because the steering wheel and steering column did not proximately
cause the accident. s6 Also, in Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. 7
the district court, bound to apply Mississippi law, held that the
failure of an airplane seat and restraining harness to function on
impact, which allowed the plaintiffs decedent to be thrown violent-
ly into the plane's instrument panel, was not actionable because
the plaintiffs allegations required the initial accident to be de-
fined as the crash of the aircraft and not the failure of the seat
and harness or the death of the pilot. 8 Notably, Williams cited
the Howard rationale as being contrary to the statement in Walton
that manufacturer liability arose from "intended use". The court
also noted the sharp criticism of the Walton and Howard deci-
sions by commentators.59
Nevertheless, in Pattillo v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation,
6 0
the court refused to hold Cessna responsible for seat belts and
seat anchors that broke during a collision and which caused the
pilot, Pattillo, to be thrown against the instrument panel and out
of the airplane to his death. Again, the initial cause of the acci-
dent predetermined the issue of the intended use of the seat belts,
which may or may not have been a malfunctioning safety device.
Although Walton was decided under the guise of strict liabili-
ty, the "initial cause" rule was easily transferred by the court to
negligence in Ford Motor Company v. Simpson, 61 and to breach
of expressed and implied warranty in the Howard and Pattillo
decisions, 2 with no rationalization other than a strict adherence
to the Evans and Walton dogma.
It is obvious that the strict liability rule promulgated in State
Stove is a distant cousin to the outcome produced in Walton where
the court saw fit to announce a "duty-breach" rule "growing out
of the intended normal use for which the product was manufac-
56. Id. at 729.
57. 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
58. Id. at 607.
59. Id. (citing Maraist & Barksdale, Mississippi Products Liability-A Critical Analysis, 43
Miss. L. J. 139, 180 n. 200 (1972)).
60. 379 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1980). The court could have avoided second accident just by
the determination that the crash was so severe that no distinct injuries could be found resulting
from the seat belt failure.
61. 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970). The case involved the negligent placement of a heater
in a truck.
62. In Howard the warranty issue was dismissed because the warranty on the truck did not
state that the telescopic column "would telescope under any and all circumstances and conditions."
249 So. 2d at 729. In Pattillo it was stated that the implied warranty of fitness was to protect
passengers in the event of a survivable crash, and the crash was not alleged to have been sur-
vivable. 379 So. 2d at 1225.
[Vol. 2:347
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tured." 63 Although the court stated that this "duty-breach" was
not synonymous with a finding of negligence, there can be little
doubt that subsequent second accident decisions have interpreted
Walton to mean that a defective product must cause the initial ac-
cident or the defendant must have had actual knowledge of the
defect and its consequences,6 ' or the defendant must have under-
taken a specific responsibility to the plaintiff in relation to the
product" to satisfy "duty-breach". This additional condition of a
finding of "duty-breach" in respect to strict liability has led at least
to one comment that the court may have eliminated strict liability
in tort for products liability in this state.66
Negligence, Proximate Cause, and Foreseeability
In relation to a negligence action, Walton bears 6ven less
resemblance to the previous doctrine of the court. The sec-
ond accident theory substitutes (or confuses) proximate cause of
injury with the immediate cause of the accident,67 moreover, in
this state there may be two or more proximate causes of the in-
jury even though there may be only one immediate cause of the
accident. Gulf Refining Company v. Brown,"confirms the rule that:
If a defendant is negligent and this negligence combines with that of
another, or with any other independent intervening cause, he is liable,
although his negligence was not the sole negligence, nor the sole prox-
imate cause, and although his negligence without such other indepen-
dent intervening cause would not have produced the injury.6
This rule of multiple proximate cause has been adhered to
for decades, ' and in conjunction with the rule it is also true that
63. 229 So. 2d at 573.
64. See 229 So. 2d at 570 (the court expressed that it would not discuss whether Chrysler
would be liable if knowledge of a defect were shown in evidence).
65. In Howard, it was determined that the manufacturer of a telescopic steering column did
not guarantee that it would telescope during side impact collision. See 249 So. 2d at 729.
66. Maraist & Barksdale, supra note 59, at 151. This article included a discussion on the
application of negligence concepts to strict liability.
67. Proximate cause is defined as "[t]hat which, in a natural or continuous sequence, un-
broken by any efficient or intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1391 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
68. 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765 (1944).
69. Id. at 148, 16 So. 2d at 769 (quoting Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Woodham, 99
Miss. 318, 333, 54 So. 890, 891 (1910) (quoting Harrison v. Kansas City Elec. Co., 195 Mo.
606, 93 S.W.951, 956-57 (1906).
70. See, e.g., Griffin v. Harkey, 215 So. 2d 866 (Miss. 1968); American Creosote Works
of Louisiana v. Harp., 215 Miss. 5, 60 So. 2d 514 (1952); Planters Wholesale Grocery v. Kin-
cade, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So. 2d 578 (1951).
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one wrongdoer's acts cannot be joined with another's to enlarge
the responsibility of one of them.71
As to foreseeability, Walton eliminates the concept that if
subsequent negligence is foreseeable, that negligence is not in-
dependent and intervening, but is concurrent with the prior
negligence.7' Such a standard has heretofore, and presumably still
in cases involving non-manufacturers, been essential to the court
in determining a standard of fair play to impose liability on distinct
wrong-doers. Thus, a truly independent and intervening cause of
injury73 can supersede an original culpable act, but when this
negligence is foreseeable, the risk created by the first party must
include the intervention of the forseeable negligence of others.
Environment in any decision not involving second accident
is always taken into consideration when reviewing the standard
of reasonable care "[which] may require the defendant to protect
the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be
anticipated'."7 Because automobile accidents must logically be
anticipated,7 Walton had to ignore the issue of foreseeability or
face an embarrassing and overt incongruity, for in strict liability
as well as negligence, foreseeability of harm is the touchstone
of liability.76 Walton does away with comparative negligence.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Walton, it is difficult to determine which
rules still operate the different theories of strict liability,
negligence, and warranty as discussed above, unless it is conceded
that manufacturers have been granted special immunity or a dispen-
sation from liability by our court to the exclusion of protection
for consumers. It is inconceivable that a defendant in this state
can avoid liability for death caused by the explosion of a defec-
tive automobile gas tank following impact because the gas tank
did not cause the collision.77
71. Blizzard v. Fitzsimmons, 193 Miss. 484, 10 So. 2d 343 (1942).
72. Canton Broiler Farms, Inc. v. Warren, 214 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1968).
73. This was defined as an independent and voluntary act of another which leads in unbroken
sequence to the injury. Hoke v. W. L. Holcomb and Associates, 186 So. 2d 474, 477 (Miss. 1966).
74. 214 So. 2d at 677.
75. See supra, note 29.
76. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), includes the foreseeability
concept in strict liability but there is authority that the doctrine has no part in the concept of strict
liability in tort. Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).




Furthermore, all precedent and authority listed in the Walton
rule has been totally eradicated, and it has become clear that prod-
ucts decisions, like all others, can only be properly determined
by applying general principles governing tort law. The narrow
view of Walton unrealistically denies a plaintiff access to the real
culprit who caused the injury, and places the blame on society
or the failure of the legislature to act to impose standards. But
such a determination is in conflict with the policy decision adopted
in State Stove to insure that the cost of injuries from defective
products should be applied to the manufacturer who marketed the
product and not to the innocent consumer.78 The finding in Walton
that the intended use of an automobile does not include accidents
is untenable,7" and the rule when extended to other types of pro-
ducts makes a farce of the term "intended use".
Perhaps the Mississippi court will review Walton with an
awareness of the need for consumer protection'e and impose liabili-
ty on manufacturers for defective products. The erosion of the
Evans' rule is not only unfair, but produces a special immunity
for manufacturers contradictory to prior tort principles.
Maryellen Radigan Duprel
78. 189 So. 2d at 120 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962)).
79. Between one-fifth and two-thirds of all automobiles manufactured are involved in 50,000
fatalities and some two million disabling injuries yearly. Nader & Page, Automobile Design and
the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 645 (Aug. 1967).
80. In a recent decision the court upheld the doctrine in application to an accident involving
a motorcycle safety helmet which burst on impact during an automobile-minibike collision. Affirm-
ing the trial court in a memorandum the court chose to remain silent in spite of the appellant's
strong arguments that the intended use of the helmet was to provide protection for the wearer
in the event of an accident. Odum v. Glover, 413 So.2d 722 (Miss. 1982) (memo only).
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